The Transcultural Turn
Interrogating Memory Between and Beyond Borders World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it. The contribution which an organized and living Europe can bring to civilization is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations. (Schuman, 1950) Robert Schuman's1 words on 09 May 1950, proposing to place French and German coal and steel industries under a common High Authority -the forerunner of the European Commission -incorporate in an exemplary way the principles that have guided the initial integration process of the European Union. The determination to avoid another war among European nations has since then been central to the master narrative of European integration, being invoked particularly during celebrative commemorations of the founding instants of the European Union.2 What role has this narrative played during the different phases of the integration process? Can the experience of war and repression, genocide and dictatorship during WWII be regarded as the EU's founding myth? When did the goal of a shared understanding of this seminal event gain prominence? If we presuppose that this emerging form of collective memory transcends nationally bound types of remembering, could an emerging collective European memory become the base for the formation of an overarching political identity?
By tracing the prominence of references made to the experiences of WWII in speeches by presidents of the High Authority and the European Commission between 1950 and 2009 on the one hand and in the different treaty-texts on the other, it will be possible to answer these questions and to establish the importance memories of WWII have had for the EU integration project and the emergence of a collective European memory framework. The analysis of the different EU policy instruments and discussions on their implementation will furthermore shed light on the nature of this framework: Is it a truly transcultural framework 1 French minister of Foreign Affairs. 2 As for example during celebrations of "Europe Day" taking place each year on the 09 May in commemoration of the Schuman Declaration in 1950. "Europe Day" became an official European celebrative day during the European Council meeting in Milan on 28/29 June 1985 but the recurrence of the Schuman Declaration had been celebrated with commemorative speeches by the European Institutions already before (Curti, 2005) . that cuts across different national memory regimes? Does it integrate existing, more specific, frames of remembrance or does it try to create something new, thus overwriting these existing frameworks?
The terms "transnational" and "transcultural" are being used in reference to the subjects they substantiate. While transnational memory describes frameworks that cut across memories tied to the narrow boundaries of national nation states, transcultural memory is a wider concept going beyond national frontiers cutting also across divisions present within national societies. It thus follows closely the definition given by Dirk Moses and Michael Rothberg in the opening chapter.
EU's founding myths
Founding acts and political myths are important tools for political communities because they provide sources of political identity and legitimacy that go beyond the mechanisms of institutional democracy. Founding myths tend to emphasize the interruption with the past, the break with old traditions and the reorganisation of a community around new values. Political legitimacy is drawn from this. As Hannah Arendt puts it: "Legitimacy bases itself on an appeal to the past, while justification relates to an end that lies in the future" (Arendt, 1970) . The historical correctness of the political myth in question is of limited importance in this context. What is important is its symbolic character that constitutes a powerful unifying force. It can create a WE-identity that gives meaning to the past and guidance for the future. "Political founding myths are narratives which bring about a collective identity beyond the social, cultural, and political fragmentation of a given community" (Probst 2003, 45) . By appealing to common experiences in the past, a sense of belonging is being generated within a social group. It creates a special bond among all those who can refer in one way or another to the evoked experience or seminal event. This process is not only limited to those who might have experienced the past personally but might include also those who share a sense of relevance regarding its memory. Founding myths thus influence the way people relate to each other and to others and are an important element in the development of a common identity. "The emergence of a common political culture is more than the abstract acceptance of universal principles. It is also the adoption of a narrative which creates identity" (Dewandre and Lenoble 1994, 97) .
The creation of a shared narrative as the base of a founding myth necessarily implies processes of selection and simplification. This is certainly true at the national level, where particularistic social and individual memories tend to get homogenised into a coherent national narrative (see Assmann, 2007) . We can presuppose that the situation on the supranational level looks similar. Applied to the EU context this would mean that the emergence of a European memory might transcend national forms of memory by creating an additional level where memories are homogenised and simplified. The question to be posed is whether this necessarily implies the erasure of national and local forms of remembrance or if it means the creation of a further supranational arena where diverging memories can find their expression. Dewandre and Lenoble's reference to universal principles might give an indication of the possible basis for such an arena. It resonates with Levy and Sznaider's (2002) idea of the globalisation of Holocaust memory which situates the Holocaust as an event disconnected from its historical origins and more as a universal symbol for human rights violations triggering political actions and reactions. In the European context this would mean that the sense of a shared past might facilitate the development of a narrative of identity based on universal values detached from national elements of memory and identity.
Following an analytical proposal by Giesen (1998) , there are three modes of assimilating collective memories into a collective identity: the primordial, the traditional and the reflexive mode. The primordial mode bases identity on a mythical past. The traditional mode constructs collectives by transforming history into a story of glory and success. The reflexive mode presupposes a basic rupture with a glorious past and forces community members to take a reflexive view of themselves and others. While the primordial and the traditional modes are characteristic for the construction of national identities, the reflexive mode might best describe the process pursued by the EU of constructing a symbolic space in which all the different European memories can be contained. To be able to test this hypothesis, we have to have a closer look at the different founding myths that have characterised EU history from its very beginning.
Europe has several foundation myths ranging from stories belonging to Greek mythology ("the rape of Europa") to the first emergence of the idea of a European order during the Enlightenment. Considering the wealth of legends (true or false) it is not surprising that the question of the origins of Europe and the closely connected question of "what is European" has caused fierce debates during the European constitutional process. While ideas on the origin of Europe abound, the situation for the European Union as an economic and political entity, is much clearer. First proposals to found a European federation were made in the 1920s by Aristide Briand, French minister for Foreign Affairs. The idea of a united Europe was moreover repeatedly voiced by intellectuals3, politi-cal associations4 and resistance movements5 before and during the two world wars. Concrete political action, however, was taken only after the end of WWII.
After the foundation of the Council of Europe and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation in 1948, France took the initiative for further economic and political integration. The idea for the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was borne out of the necessity to find a solution to the eminent end of the Marshall Plan. The speech made by the French minister of Foreign Affairs Robert Schuman (quoted above) on 9 May 1950 is conventionally regarded as having inaugurated what later was to become the European Union. References to WWII and the importance of peaceful relations among countries (particularly France and Germany) abound in Schuman's speech and were subsequently mentioned in the very first line of the Treaty establishing the ECSC in 1951: "Considering that world peace can be safeguarded only by creative efforts commensurate with the dangers that threaten it" (European Coal and Steel Community, 1951) .
However, we might, as Probst (2003, 48) points out, overestimate the ideational motives of this founding story. One of the main reasons for France to propose to place French and German coal and steel industries under a common High Authority was its interest to limit Germany's military and political power and to gain control over its steel industry.6 France's ambitions were not met with opposition because they met in its turn the aims of the US and the Adenauer government to reintegrate Germany into the international community. Adenauer's first comment about the Schumann plan was apparently: "That is our breakthrough" (Judt 1994, 28-31) . And even Jean Monnet mentioned 'peace' as being only one of the goals of the ECSC among many others. If we take into account the often very idealistic ideas connected to transcultural memory models, seeing the commemoration of the same historical event as the necessary glue that has the power to unify people on the one hand and trigger political actions on the other (in this case in order to secure peace), the example of the origins of the EU provides a good counterexample of the sometimes very diverging political interests that can shape cosmopolitan projects of any kind. The often presented transcultural origin of the EU, the universal longing for peace and harmony, has certainly 4 For example the Swiss "Europa-Union". 5 See for example the text 'Declaration on a European Cooperation' drawn up on 31 March 1944 in Paris by representatives of the Italian, French, Dutch, Norwegian, Danish, Yugoslav and Polish resistance movements, available from Centre d'action pour la federation européenne, Neuchâtel. 6 Before presenting the Schuman plan, the French government had tried to come to an agreement about the exploitation of the German raw material with the Soviet Union. Only after this attempt had failed, did France decide to change its strategy. not been the only rationale behind the creation of the ECSC, proving once more the mythical aspect of the founding of the EU. This becomes even clearer when analysing the role the EU's origins have played during the Cold War.
The Cold War
References to the experience of war and dictatorship that were still present in the "founding fathers'" speeches and in the Union's first treaty, almost completely disappeared in speeches made by European Commission presidents during the Cold War. Already in the text of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, the aspiration to safeguard peace and liberty among its members is mentioned last among the many aims of the community (European Economic Community, 1957). Speeches commemorating the Schuman Declaration make reference to the great achievements of the ECSC and the EEC and underline the importance of the existence of economic and political cooperation, but say very little about the experience of war and dictatorship being at the origin of this cooperation.
This might be explained by the fact that memories of the seminal events that the founding myth of the EU was harking back to were far from being uniform across countries. The reconstruction of memories of WWII had been from the beginning a predominantly national affair, guided by the political need to protect the positive self-image of the nation. Memories were considered to be politically explosive and unusable during an era when Europe was both divided and bound together by a sharp ideological contest between East and West. Memories of the recent past were frozen and political images and interpretations adjusted to the political status quo of the Cold War (Judt 1992, 83-119) . A form of collective amnesia was the result and any reference to Europe's contested heritage was omitted from public speeches by political actors. If we analyse contemporary discourses on memory, we can still see traces of this tendency to avoid active confrontation, particularly with those memories that hark back to the division of the continent during the Cold War Years. The best examples of this are certainly the debates surrounding the installation of a remembrance day for all victims of totalitarian regimes on August 23rd. It could be argued that the mere attempt to create some kind of an overarching transcultural memory that has the power to overlay more localised commemorative discourses is a new attempt to express the wish for a form of amnesia through the conscious homogenisation of conflictual memories.
However, whilst the Cold War might have impeded active confrontation with the past, its ideological confrontation with Communism may also have contrib-uted to further European integration. It has been suggested by several scholars that more than the memory of the traumatic experiences of WWII, it had been the division of Europe into East and West that has fostered European cooperation (Thum, 2004) . The opposition of the Soviet Union on the one hand and the European Community on the other had created a sense of community and directed major attention towards common interests that was able to cover many of the real existing differences (including divisions concerning memories of the past) between the Western European states. This is not to say that transcultural cohesion of any kind has an ideological basis. It only suggests that it is often the outcome of other needs and political requirements of that particular moment in history that might foster the development of a transcultural project.
After 1989
The fragility of this construct became obvious in 1989 when the breaking open of the bipolar political world resulted in an eruptive return of memory and a reawakening of history. After a period of strongly stylised and standardised ideas of the past, many countries started to slowly face conflicting, painful and embarrassing memories. It was particularly the opening up of archives, allowing for increased research activity into the circumstances of WWII and the Holocaust, that resulted in a more differentiated vision of victims and collaborators, often correcting the national memory constructs that had been built in the first 30 years after the end of WWII. The crumbling of national myths made a new confrontation with questions of guilt and responsibility for the WWII events necessary and allowed for the first attempts of talking about a "European memory". Already in the 1980s, discussions of "European values" had frequently, but by no means exclusively, addressed the legacy of twentieth-century warfare and genocide in Europe (Speth, 1999) . The institutional consolidation of the EU in the 1990s and in particular the forceful confrontation with the memory of Communism (often called the "second Totalitarianism of the 20 th century") led to the increased understanding of WWII as a European War and of Fascism/Nazism as a European phenomenon. This can be clearly seen when looking at public commemorative speeches in different European member states. Particularly in the past 20 years a clear shift away from a very nationally focused dealing with the legacy of WWII towards a more cosmopolitan way of addressing questions of guilt and responsibility can be discerned. A similar development can be seen on the European level. In light of the end of the Cold War, the original sources of inspiration that had led to the construction of the EU right after the Second World War came back to the fore.
"We have to employ more than ever our intellectual power and our political will in order to build the European house whose foundations however have to remain the original ideas of Robert Schuman", said Frans Andriessen (1990) , the VicePresident of the European Commission, on 09 May 1990. He is echoing Jacques Delors' words pronounced one day earlier during the commemorative celebrations of 'Europe Day', in which Delors had underlined the relevance Schuman's original ideas still have for the European project:
…I would like to quote a phrase of the speech Robert Schuman made in the Collège de Bruges in October 1953: "Our initial considerations were of a much less economic than political nature. Detoxify the relationship between France and Germany, secure peace, create a climate of cooperation across Europe. This was our main aim." If we replaced the word "France" with a list of all the European countries, this declaration would be as relevant today as it was forty years ago. (Delors, 1990) Speeches in the 1990s are not only characterised by a reawakened interest in the original aims of European integration but also by a more open dealing with Europe's painful heritage. On 09 May 1994 Sir Leon Brittan, Vice President of the European Commission, does not only underline today's relevance of the principles evoked by Schuman in 1950 but connects the 9 May to two significant dates of WWII: the 9 May 1940, when Hitler ordered the invasion of the Netherlands, Belgium and France and the 9 May 1945, "the first full day of freedom" (Brittan, 1994) . He dedicates a large part of his speech to the recollection of "the darkest period of its [Europe's] history for many centuries" (Brittan, 1994) , before emphasizing the importance of this era for the development of the guiding principles of today's EU: "These foundations, these values, [democracy, liberty, equality, solidarity, justice] spring from our continent's history and experiences. They have always continued to shine in Europe even, as in 1940, when it seemed that darkness had all but engulfed us" (Brittan, 1994) .
The growing time period between the events of WWII and the present day, the arrival of new generations and their emotional distance to the recollections of their parents, and the slow disappearance of contemporary witnesses allowed for a more direct confrontation with the experience of war and dictatorship. Levy and Sznaider (2002, 96) identify three central changes in this context: (1) a generational transition from social to historical memories; (2) a growing historicization of WWII; (3) the identification of the Holocaust as unique with reference to the past and universal for the future. It was particularly the new focus on the Holocaust that started to dominate the public dealing with Europe's recent past from the end of the 1990s onwards.
The Holocaust
In the immediate post-war years, the Holocaust did not permeate public discourse, nor was its commemoration in any form institutionalized. It had been originally conceived as part of a larger practice of war crimes in an almost endless list of Nazi cruelties (Levy and Sznaider 2002, 94) . Taking into account Germany's initial desire to forget about this aspect of the Third Reich and considering other countries' attempts to cover up instances of anti-Semitism and collaboration in deportation, it is not surprising that, in contrast to the desire to prevent another war among European countries, the genocide was of no significance for early western integration. In the years between 1950 and 1989, when political and intellectual debates about the ongoing process of west European integration focused on the future of the European project, the Holocaust -as a central point of reference or even as a founding act -was never mentioned. Neither in public speeches, nor in the treaties, is reference made to the role the Holocaust might have played in defining the original values or the political goals of the European Union (Probst 2003, 54) .
Andrew Beattie might therefore be right when he says that "recent attempts to transform the Holocaust into the EU's foundational myth […] rewrite and distort the historical record" (2007, 16) . The interpretation of the Holocaust as founding act is, of course, only plausible from an ex-post perspective. It nevertheless has to be understood within a certain context, namely as an attempt to create an overarching political identity beyond the institutional framework of the EU. Dan Diner argues in this context that the commemoration of the Holocaust is increasingly becoming the core of a unifying European memory, giving constitution building in Europe the necessary symbolic foundation: "The ethical imperatives of this founding act constitute a catalogue of values which are of normative importance for a political Europe" (Diner, 2000) . That the commemoration of the Holocaust -as an event which gives meaning -is not only a source of symbolic legitimacy but also of political action and values, can be seen by the determination the EU demonstrates when it comes to the rejection of racism, anti-Semitism, and xenophobia. The joint Motion for a Resolution on remembrance of the Holocaust, anti-Semitism and racism voted on by the European Parliament on 27 January 2005 reads:
The sixtieth anniversary of the liberation of Nazi Germany's death camp at Auschwitz-Birkenau […] is not only a major occasion for European citizens to remember and condemn the enormous horror and tragedy of the Holocaust, but also for addressing the disturbing rise in anti-Semitism and especially anti-Semitic incidents in Europe, and for learning anew the wider lessons about the dangers of victimising people on the basis of race, ethnic origin, religion, political or sexual orientation, or social classification (European Parliament, 2005) .
It is striking that all previous resolutions on racism, xenophobia and antiSemitism by the European Parliament7 also make reference to the Holocaust. It has become the yardstick with which other political developments are being measured and evaluated. This became particularly evident during the Balkan crisis and the unsuccessful NATO intervention in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995, when military involvement in Kosovo was primarily framed as a moral obligation largely in response to previous failures to intervene on behalf of innocent civilians. Similar lines of argument could be perceived during disputes on military interventions in Rwanda, Iraq or Afghanistan. As Aleida Assmann puts it: "The Holocaust has not become a single universally shared memory, but it has become the paradigm or template through which other genocides and historical traumas are very often perceived and presented" (Assmann 2007, 14) .
The importance the Holocaust has acquired in the past years can also be seen by the number of initiatives that have been taken in the last decennial in order to anchor its memory firmly to the institutional setting. Already in 1995 the European Parliament passed a resolution on a day to commemorate the Holocaust (European Parliament, 1995) but the first concrete step into this direction was taken in 2000 by the Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson, who invited representatives of sixteen nations (among them thirteen present and future members of the European Union) to a forum to discuss and define a common framework for commemorating and teaching the Holocaust. When in 2002 the Council of Europe decided to introduce a continent-wide Day of Remembrance, albeit with the flexibility for individual countries to select the most appropriate date, most countries did choose 27 January, confirming its transversal meaning and transforming it into a truly European memorial day. In addition to national initiatives, since 2000 the 27 th of January is being officially commemorated by representatives of the European institutions as well, making it, together with "Europe-Day", one of the few European commemoration dates that are being celebrated transnationally.8 7 27 October 1994 , published in Official Journal C 323, 21.11.1994 27 April 1995 , published in Official Journal C 126, 22.5.1995 26 October 1995 , published in Official Journal C 308, 20.11.1995 30 January 1997 , published in Official Journal C 55, 24.2.1997 , p. 17 and 16 March 2000 , published in Official Journal C 377, 29.12.2000 . 8 Even though Europe was the stage for the Holocaust, the memory of it is no longer specifically European but extends far beyond Europe's boundaries. On 24 January 2005, the United Nations for the first time in its history commemorated the Holocaust in a special session and on 01 November 2005, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution designating 27 January as "International Day of Commemoration in memory of the victims of the Holocaust".
Memory and Identity
The question that remains is: why has there been such a renewed interest in Europe's past after statesmen had focused much more on the future throughout the Cold War? Aleida Assmann's contention that the future has lost much of its power to integrate, while the past is becoming increasingly important for the formation of identity (Assmann 2007, 11) may explain this. Until the 1980s, the EU was mainly an economic, legal-political entity. It had few shared values and symbols, and could certainly not be called a community of memory (Beattie 2007, 1) . When it became clear that economic prosperity and the images of a market community do not suffice to create a feeling of belonging, "the promotion of a shared historical consciousness became part of a larger attempt to imbue the dry bureaucratic and economic process of European integration with a common identity" (Speth, 1999) . Since the 1990s, historians have argued that very similar mechanisms are at work regarding the "memory work" of an individual nation and of the European community.9 Many political scientists are likewise convinced that the main device for generating a collective sense of identity in a complex society such as the European one lies in the mode of remembering the past and argue that Europe needs a memory in order to build a common identity, just as nations do.10 Going back to the proposal by Giesen (1998) , the question emerges which model the development of the EU narrative followed. The above analysis suggests that particularly the first years of European integration followed a model closer to the traditional mode than to the reflexive one. The avoidance of conflictual memory discourses during the Cold War and the exclusive concentration on the integration success story hints at this. It could be argued that the commemoration of the Holocaust, seen as a transcultural symbol for human rights violations, could serve as an example for the emerging reflexive mode. However, if the reflexive mode according to Giesen implies a "rupture with a glorious past" and "forces community members to take a reflexive view of themselves and others", the mere reference to the Holocaust as a counter-element to the values of the European Union is not enough. A true reflection on the elements that make up a narrative, including positive and negative memories, would be necessary in this instance.
So far the analysis suggests that the construction of a European memory goes hand in hand with homogenisation and simplification rather than the manifestation of a diverse commemorative climate open to multiple interpretations of the past. First elements of the reflexive mode might only be discerned when looking at the debates that precede the drawing up of resolutions and recommendations. Those are the moments when the EU becomes an arena for debate and conflict, where different memory regimes oppose each other, can find their expression and are listened to. The emergence of a reflexive awareness of the coexistence of the dreadful past of perpetrators with the traumatic past of victims, in particular, might slowly create a feeling of collective responsibility, going beyond flags and coins and the sense of belonging created by the simple membership in the European community. "Europe, on the fast track to integration, seems more and more to be finding a common unifying memory in the events of World War II", writes Dan Diner in the New German Critique (2003, 36) . Is a collective European memory of WWII emerging?
A European memory?
Collective memory can manifest itself in a variety of forms: as incorporated collective memory in the minds of people, as objectified memory in the form of museums and monuments ("lieux de mémoire"), and as institutionalized memory in curricula and rituals of remembering. Since the 1990s the European Union has made increasing efforts to frame the emergence of a European objectified and institutionalised memory. The installation of two official European remembrance days (Europe Day and Holocaust Memorial Day) and the frequent reference that is made in official speeches to the "bitter experiences common to all Europeans", are but two examples of this. Impulses to commemorate the events of WWII within a transnational framework have particularly come from historians, who started to change the perspective in their research from a national to a European one. The project Lieux de mémoire for example, launched for France by Pierre Nora and his colleagues in 1981 has been successfully imitated in other European countries in search for shared "European sites of memory". On the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the European Community the Musée de l'Europe opened in Brussels and various European research teams -funded by the European Science Foundation -are engaged in investigating key historical events that make up the European imaginaire.11 National initiatives are especially taken up by the European Commission, which is funding a series of remembrance projects as part of its Democracy campaign,12 an initiative launched in 2005 to mark the 60th anniversary of the fall of Nazism. Its objective is to foster "action, debate and reflection related to European citizenship and democracy, shared values, common history and culture, and bringing Europe closer to its citizens by promoting Europe's values and achievements, while preserving the memory of its past" (European Commission, 2008) . History is clearly seen as one unifying element, allowing for the reflection on the past and the definition of values for the present.
The situation is, however, not as clear-cut as the European Commission likes to suggest. There is probably little disagreement about the values for the present and the future, but still a lot over those of the past. As Aleida Assman puts it: "There are political norms and standards for a peaceful coexistence within the European Union, but there are as yet no norms and standards for the peaceful coexistence of European memories" (Assmann 2007, 19) . Peter Esterházy expresses a similar opinion: "What was supposed to be united has been torn apart in self-hatred and self-pity […] . Besides the untruth of the exclusive perpetrator, there is the untruth of the exclusive victim, and the unspoken "we" of the national memory lies hidden beneath both […] . A common European knowledge about ourselves as both perpetrators and victims is not yet in view" (Esterházy 2004, 16) . The extent to which simplistic memory constellations continue to divide more often than unite became evident in an exemplary way during the European constitutional debate, when the Polish head of state demanded that the number of Polish Nazi victims needed to be counted when assessing correctly Poland's proportional votes in today's Europe. Examples such as this illustrate the need to move beyond the optimistic view of memory constellations as put forward by scholars like Levy and Sznaider and take into account the potentially negative impact that simplistic memory constellations can have if they are used as a political tool. A shared European understanding of the past can certainly only develop if inherited, primarily national approaches to history are being overcome, opening the door towards a transcultural form of European memory that is open to discussion and debate and enhances dialogue between nations, rather than being smothered into a constructed transcendental narrative.
The European Union is undoubtedly trying to frame this development through the initiatives mentioned above. Following the line of thought of Klaus Eder (2005) , it is precisely the "self-organizing dynamics of remembering the process of coordinating particular memories in an institutionally bounded com-municative space", that might allow for the emergence of a transcultural memory that transgresses the confines of nationally determined memories. Eder assumes that if nationally bounded memories are reorganized on a higher level, a process of reflective abstraction takes place that generates higher ordered principles for remembering a collective past. While the EU is aspiring to reach this goal, it is exactly the weakness of the 'institutionally bounded communicative space' and the lack of symbolic power that is nevertheless still hampering this process.13
Any discussion of a European memory would furthermore have to include reflections on the division of Europe during the Cold War and the diverging memory frameworks that developed in East and West in consequence -a topic that the EU has not addressed sufficiently to date. How difficult the integration of different memory structures can be became evident after the reunification of Germany.14 A united Europe will have to face the same questions and problems with regards coming to terms with its own past if it wants to arrive at a common understanding of the EU's "founding myth".
Conclusions
The above analysis shows clearly how the perception and reception of this myth has changed over the years. While the need to avoid any repetition of military conflict between European states guided the initial integration process of the European Union, it was mainly the pressure for internal unity that provided the main rationale during the Cold War, causing the disappearance of references made to Europe's painful divisive past from most public memory discourses. The end of the Cold War did not only revive those conflicting, painful and embarrassing memories, allowing for a more differentiated view of them, but led at the same time to the increased understanding of WWII as a European war and of Fascism/Nazism as a European phenomenon.
Since the 1990s, more than the aim of avoiding another war among Europeans, it is the memory of the common experience of repression, dictatorship and genocide that turned into the point of reference for the definition of the Union's values and political goals. The existence of a catalogue of shared principles stemming from the experiences of a common past is furthermore seen as being the starting point for the creation of an overarching political identity going beyond 13 The same argument is usually applied to the European identity debate. 14 See for example Herf (1997) . the institutional framework of the EU. The EU's attempts to actively frame the development of a collective European memory can be understood in this context.
Despite the positive signals coming from the EU's initiatives, simplistic national memory constellations and the Union's lack of legitimacy and symbolic power still hamper the development of a shared European understanding of the past. A clear conflict still seems to exist between the culture of memory developed over the past 20 years -which shows early traces of a transcultural mode but failed to go much beyond the mere homogenization of already existing national forms of memory -on the one hand and a more self-reflexive "ideal" form that truly fosters dialogue among nations on the other.
There are certainly still many steps to be taken on the Union's road to integration before we can effectively speak about a collective European memory that allows citizens to reflect without feelings of guilt or anger about the events that were at the origins of the EU. Yet despite the fact that the idea of a common European memory still seems to be more of a vision than a reality, it is certainly the great potential the project of European unification inherently possesses. What remains to be questioned is the desirability of such a project and the implications it has for the integration of immigrants into European society. Particularly with respect to the latter point it might precisely be the emergence of a transcultural framework that can fulfil this aim better than a transnational framework tied to narrow national boundaries.
